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·,:ADDRESS OF SEN. STROM THURMOND (D-SC) BEFORE U. S. SENAT~
O!i'
OF NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL TO SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE FOR RELIEF
AGAINST MANUFACTURED TEXTILES UNDER SECTION 22 OF THE AGRICULTURAL
ADJUSTMENT ACT.

Mr. President, the tragic results of our misguided foreign trade
policies/ continue to come home to haunt us.

More and more domestic

industries are feeling the impact, and an ever increasing number of
American jobs are disappearing.

Undoubtedly, the worse is yet to

come.
As with almost all national issues, the foreign trade issue
appears to the great majority of people as either all black or all
white.

Any modification of the policy, or criticism of its operat1on1
is considered by the so-called "free traders" as heresy/4orn in -the
spirit of isolationism.

This attitude has contributed markedly to

an almost complete lack of objectivity, which may ultimately destroy
our economic system.
A careful examination of the operation of our purportedly
"reciprocal" trade program/reveals an astounding lack of
-city. 11
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This lack of reciprocity, coupled with such factors as our

encouragement and subsidies to foreign industrialization, the wage
differential existing between our country and foreign countries,
and the tax advantages enjoyed by foreign competitors, is continually
and increasingly/eroding both the foreign and domestic markets of
domestic producers.
The ideas that led to the conception of our foreign trade
program/were undoubtedly sound.

Into the statutes that effectuated

this program were written procedures /for the eateguarding of the
markets--particularly the domestic markets--of our domestic producers.
The operation of the program, however, has, f~OJll the beginning, been
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at wide variance with the theory/ underlying its conception.

In

practice, there has been scarely any utilization of the procedures
authorized/ror preservation of our domestic industry and employment.
The pleas of those portions of our domestic economy/which have borne
the brunt of the first assault/have been like a voice in the
wilderness, unheard and unanswered.
For those who are truly interested in the advanceme•~
foreign trade, this should be most alarming.

of

With every plea from

a segment of our domestic economy that goes ignored, more fuel is
added to the fires of oppostlonfao our trade program in its entirety.
For those who lose their jobs or savings/ on the sacrificial altar
of our untouchable trade policy, it is understandably difficult to
be objective/ about the benefits derived from trade with the world
community.

It is much more characteristic for such a person /4o be

violently and emotionally opposed to foreign trade--in other words,
to see nothing but the black side.
Up to the present tim~nly a minority of the American public
has been directly affected/to the extent that violent opposition to
the trade

program has been inspired.

Only the blind, however, can

fail to see / that a~ greater inroads are made on domestic markets
of basic industries such as steel, and other bellweather industries
such as automobiles, such unalterable opposition will continue to
multiply by leaps and bounds.

Unless the safety-valve procedures

provided in the law /are utilized and invoked to perform their
intended function, our foreign trade program is doomed to sudden
and inglorious death/at the aands of an aroused andangry public
sentiment, occasioned by the blindness of the program's staunchest
defenders.
- 2 -

Some of the safety-valves available /to make the foreign trade
program practically workable on a long term basis /are written into
the so-called "Reciprocal Trade Act" itself, such as the peril
point and escape clause provisions.

Other safety-valve features

exist, such as that provided in Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, and although they are not an integral part of the
Trade Act, their provisions are incorporated into all trade
agreements/ made by our Government with foreign countries.

Thus we

breach no agreement fiihen we invoke the provisions of the safeguard
procedures /to insure the preservation of some part of our domestic
economy.

Mr. President, I have mentioned some of the competitive
disadvantages / accruing to domestic producers generally/when
competing with foreign products, as for example, wage differentials,
less realistic tax depreciation rates, and government subsidies to
foreign competitors.

These competitive disadvantages apply in

varying degree /to any field where domestic industry must compete
with its foreign counter-part.

Other competitive disadvantages

apply to particular segments of our domestic economy/to the
exclusiotf of other segments.
The most staggering competitive disadvantage/which applies
to one particular segment of our domestic 1ndustry1 arises from our
two-price system of cotton.

On August l of this year, the price

differential on raw cotton will increase to eight cents per pound.
This means, Mr. President, that effective August 1, domestic
manufacturers of cotton products /will have to pay eight cents per
pound more for their raw material/than will their foreign competitora
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To appreciate the full impact of this price disparity./2.n
favor of foreign manufacturers, it is necessary to understand that
the cost of raw cotton /makes up well over half of the average selling
price /or a y.ard of gray cloth in the United States.

In foreign

countries, where the wage level is much less than in the United
States, the ratio of cost of raw material to selling price of the
manufactured 1tem/4s presumably much higher.
In order to grasp the extent of the impact of this differential
in cost of raw materials, it is essential that we take into account
the wage differential/to which it is cumulative.

The average hourly

earning of workers in the textile industry/ in the United States/ is

$1.58.

In Hong Kong, a major source of textile production, the

standard textile wage is reliably reported to be 6.8 cents an hour.
Even Japan, with its textile wage of approximately 10 cents an hour-
and considered to be one of the real low wage countries--is reportedly
finding itself unable to compete with the lower wages ,/2,eing paid in
other Asian countries.
Is there any wonder that there is such a growing animosity/
toward our trade program?

Our Government cannot continue to turn

a deaf ear/ to the cries of anguish /from domestic producers and
workers.

Now is the time for an act of good faith by the Government /

to restore at least some partial confidence of the American people /
in the trade program.

The opportunity is at hand.

A case has been

made, and a more deserving case is hard to imagine.
On June 29, the National Cotton Cruncil, representing cotton
v

farmers, ginners, merchants, warehouseman, seed crushers and
spinners, filed with the Secretary of Agriculture/ a petition for
action on cotton textile imports under Section 22/4r the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.

Section 22 contains provisions for relief against
- 4 -

imports /if it is found that they "tend to render ineffective or
materially interfere with 11/ the agriculture program of the Government.
Under Section 22, import quotas have been imposed on upland
cotto

at a level of 30,000 bales under 1 1/8 length.

The peti~ion

of the National Cotton Council / is directed at the imports of
textiles.

I would like to briefly summarize the case made for relief,

The number of bales of cotton imported into the United States /
in textile form, including 7arn, cloth and fabricated articles has
increased from 37,510 in 1948/ to 286,630 in 1958.

Lest there be

any supposition that the trend has reached a cutoff, consider that
although textile imports from Hong Kong/ for any quarter through
April of this year

ave never exceeded two million yards of cloth,

unimpeachable reports indicate that orders have been placed /ror
future delivery/ or more than 35 million yards of soft-filled
sheetings alone / from Hong Kong.

': .:-- ~

It cannot be denied that textile

imports, now at an all-time high, are increasing at a terrific
rate.
Now let us turn to the forms of injury to the United States
cotton program/ occasioned by these textile imports.
of injury may be classified in four categories:
effect on the market for U.S. cotton ; (2) the

These forms

(1) the immediate
effect upon the

attitude of the domestic textile industry; (3) the effect upon the
domestic market development ; and (4) the build-up of future trouble
through delay.
It is self evident/ that any substantial decrease in the market
for domestic raw cotton/ materially interferes with our national
cotton program.

It behooves

us, therefore, to examine the recent

changes in the market for our domestic raw cotton, both foreign and
domestic.

It is true that our exports of textiles are larger than
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our imports, and this is often used as an excuse for our Government's
inaction.

It however, we examine the trends of imports and exports

together, it is obvious that such an excuse is completely invalid.
For example, in 1948, the imports of yarn, cloth and fabricated
products /4ere the equivalent of 38,000 bales, and the exports of
cloth and yarn were the equivalent of 689,000 bales, the difference
being 651,000 bales.

In 1958, the picture had changed materially.

Although exports of yarn and cloth in bale equivalent/ still exceeded
imports of yarn, cloth and fabricated products, the differential
had shrunk from the 651,000 bales-equivalent in 1948, to 76,000
bales--imports of yarn, cloth and fabricated products having
increased from 38,000 to 287,000, and exports of yarn and cloth
having decreased from 689,000 to 362,000.
The figures I have just stated are not an isolatectexample,
hlt are consistent with the entire trend.
the same trend.

Other figures illustrate

For instance, consider the dollar value of cotton

goods exported and imported / in the form of end products.

In 1953,

exports amounted to $62,962,000/ and imports amounted to $48,228,000,
leaving a differential of exports over imports of $14,734,000.

In

1958, exports had decreased to $58,664,000, while imports had
increased to $109,696,ooo.

The $14,734,000 advantage of exports

we enjoyed in 1953 has disappeared to be replaced by a deficit of
more than $55,000,000.
A few decades ago, the sale and use of domestically grown
raw cotton abroad /would have offset the trend in maunfactured
products.

It has not been too long since about one-half of all

the cotton consumed abroad /was impar-ted from the United States.
the last five years/ the situation is radically different, for the
United States has furnished not one-half the cotton for foreign
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consumption, but only one-seventh.

There can be no question,

incidentally, that a great portion of the raw cotton market which
we have lost/has gone to Red China.

The United States cotton

producer is losing the market rapidly.

A

Sales of raw cotton abroad

have shrunk materially, as have exports of manufactured cotton
products, while at the same time, textile imports have multiplied
rapidly.

The trend of a shrinking market for domestic cotton,

at home and overseas, progresses at an ever faster rate.
The question of the market for domestic raw cotton /can not be
left with a consideration of only the immediate and direct effects/ or
the competitive advantages of foreign competitors, however.

There

are other--if less direct, certainly just as substantial--effects
of a cumulative nature.

The attitude of the domestic textile

industry is pertinent to this point.
The impact of incredible wage differentials, tax system
disadvantages, inducements to

overseas investments offered by the

U.S. Government, and the disparity between the domeat1e and world
prices of cotton/bave not been lost on the textile entrepeneur's
thinking.

As a matter .~f fact, the confidence of the textile

manufacturer in cotton / as a source of raw material supply h s being
undermined, insofar as domestic manufacture is concerned.

His

thinking is tilted--and logically so, we must admit--in the direction
of synthetic fibers.

A continuation of such thinking / can only

result in further losses of a cotton market.
We must also be conscious of the fact that all the pressures (
are aimed at directing the future capital investment in textiles
to foreign lands, with the resultant loss of employment/ and
ultimately a further loss in market for raw cotton.
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Many have pointed to the field of market development, both
domestic,,and foreign, as the most appropriate solution to the
problem.

I could not agree more thoroughly/that an intensive program

of market development by the textile and allied industries /2.s
essential to the survival of the cotton, and indeed, the entire
textile industry.

But we must face the practical facts of life.

Market development involves major capital investments /over a long
period/2.n such things as market research, scientific research,
advertising and promotion, new plant andsiuipment, and personnel
training.

Any realist must acknowledge/ that confidence is a

condition precedent/ to any such major investments.

To date, investors

have certainly been given little reason for confidence/ by the only
source of relief--the United States Government.
The situation in which we find ourselves /will brook no delay.
The longer action for the correction of competitive disadvantages
of domestic producers is postponed, the worse the situation becomes.
Textile industries are springing up as the initial effort of
undeveloped countries.

Earlier comers to the field of textile

manufacturers/ in such places as Japan, Hong Kong and India /continue
to strain for expansion of their textile capacity--ever looking
toward capture of a larger part of the world, and particularly the
American,.textile market.

We are fast approaching a time /when this

particular facet of our trade program/will be beyond salvation.
The longer we wait, the more drastic will have to be the remedy,
and therefore, the more difficult it will be to apply.
I submit that it is hard to conceive of a more substantial
case for relier/than that which exists for the cotton industry/
under Section 22.

Even •e~e this the only mishap of our foreign

trade program, it would be incomprehensible if relief should be
denied.
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From an overall standpoint in the interest of the future foreign
trade position of our country, however, there is an even more
compelling reason/ why favorable action should be taken on the
petition of the National Cotton Council.

As I have mentioned

earlier, an ever broader segment of the American public is adopting
an attitude

of adamant, uncompromising opposition /4o the trade

policy of the United States.
increases in size.

With each passing day, this segment

Admittedly, this portion of the American people

may still be in the minority.

Already, however, the same attitude

is having an effect on the Congress.

Only last year, substantial

changes in the so-called Reciprocal Trade Act, although ultimately
defeated, received a broad base of support in Congress, and actually
were staved off only by the most vigorous opposition/ by both the
Administration and the leadership of the Congress.
If the safety-valves provided to remedy the specific hardships /
that result from the general application of the policy/ remain
tightly sealed,- there is certain to be an ultimate explosion.

The

longer the explosion is delayed /without some show of good faith by
the government, the more extreme will be the change when it comes.
The Section 22 petition of the National Cotton

Council/ not

only makes an unassailable case for relief, but provides an
unequalled opportunity for a demonstration /4hat our trade program
can be implemented in a practical manner/without destroying domestic
industry and employment.

It is my sincere hope, in which I should

be Joined by every advocate of expanded world commerce, that the
Secretary of Agriculture/and the President /will act immediately to
grant relief to the cotton industry.
- END -
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